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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ATTORNEY-CLIENT-Client's Right To Engage Out-of-State
Attorney for Advice Concerning Federal Claim Is a
Privilege and Immunity of National CitizenshipSpanos v. Skouras Theatre Corp.*
The state and federal courts, existing side by side within the
boundaries of each state, separately control admission to practice
law before their respective bars. 1 Although membership in a state
bar is generally a prerequisite for admission to the bar of a federal
court,2 the two systems do function under separate and distinct
ground rules, and they appear to have done so with a minimum of
friction. 3 However, the principal case is indicative of the problems
that may arise when state policy on the right to practice law within
the state conflicts with federal policy.
Defendant operated a chain of movie houses in and around New
York City and planned to bring an antitrust action (known as the
"industry suit") against the major movie producers for violation of
the antitrust laws. Defendant retained three New York law firms,
but also desired the services of plaintiff, an expert on antitrust problems of the motion picture industry. Since plaintiff was not a member
of the New York bar, he agreed to work with one of defendant's New
York lal'ryers and began work on the industry suit in March, 1953.
Plaintiff never applied for admission to either the bar of New York
State or of the federal court, but nonetheless continued to work on
the suit for the next five years. After plaimiff learned that defendant
had settled part of the suit, he wrote defendant demanding payment
of his contingent fee. Defendant discharged plaintiff without paying
the fee, and plaintiff brought suit in the Federal District Court for
• 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 87 Sup. Ct. 597 (1966) [hereinafter referred to as principal case].
1. It is clear that a state may regulate the admission of attorneys to practice before
the courts of the state. See, e.g., Brents v. Stone, 60 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. III. 1945); State
ex rel. Ralston v. Turner, 141 Neb. 556, 4 N.W.2d 302 (1942). The Supreme Court,
moreover, has interpreted section 1654 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. 1654 (1964), as a
legislative authorization for the federal courts to prescribe their own rules of practice.
United States v. Hvass, 355 U.S. 570, 574-76 (1958). 28 U.S.C. 1654 states that "in all courts
of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or
~y counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and
conduct causes therein."
2. :See, e.g., Kovrak. v. Ginsburg, 280 F.2d 209, 211 (3d Cir. 1960).
3. See Ginsburg v. Kovrak, 392 Pa. 143, 139 A.2d 889 (1958), in which the court enjoined from the practice of law in Pennsylvania an attorney who had not been admitted
to practice before any court of record in Pennsylvania. However, the court noted that
the injunction in "no way effect(ed) the appellant's rights to engage in the practice of
law •.• or to try cases in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania •••." Id. at 145.
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the Southern District of New York. 4 The district court allowed
recovery, stating that under local court rules5 admission of plaintiff
pro hac vice would have been authorized had he applied, and his
failure to comply with formalities should thus not bar recovery.
Moreover, the court noted, plaintiff's services were rendered in connection with an action in a federal court for alleged violation of a
federal law and, had plaintiff been admitted to the district court,
his right to recover could not be defeated because he had practiced in
New York contrary to New York law. The court thus concluded that
New York policy could not obstruct the administration of federal
questions in the federal courts.
A majority of a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit overruled
the district court's granting of recovery, stating that since plaintiff
had not been admitted to practice before the federal court, there
was no federal law governing his status and consequently New York
law determined his right to recover. The panel determined that the
New York courts would be required to refuse recovery in light of
Spivak v. Sachs, 6 a case in which an out-of-state lawyer who came to
New York and advised a client on New York law was found to have
violated sectiqn 270 of the New York Penal Law7 which forbids the
practice of law by all but duly licensed New York attorneys. The
majority acknowledged that when state law conflicts with federal
law,8 the former must yield and that had plaintiff successfully applied for leave to appear before the district court, he could have
recovered despite New York law to the contrary. However, plaintiff
failed to apply, and given New York's strong policy of not allowing
attorneys who are not licensed in New York to practice law in the
state, the court concluded that such failure could not be considered
a mere formality.
The Second Circuit sitting en bane, speaking through Judge
Friendly, reversed the decision of the panel and affirmed the decision
of the district court. The court based its decision on the district
court's interpretation of the local court rule and on a contract theory.
4. For a thorough statement of the facts of the principal case, see Spanos v. Skouras,
235 F. Supp. I, 3-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
5. S.D.N.Y. Ct. R. 3(c). For the substance of rule 3(c), see text accompanying note 9.
6. 16 N.Y.2d 163, 211 N.E.2d 329 (1965).
7. New York Penal Law § 270 provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any natural person to practice or appear as an attorney-at-law or as attorney and counselor-at-law for a person other than himself
in a court of record in this state or in any court in the city of New York, or to
furnish attorneys or counsel or an attorney and counsel to render legal services,
or to hold himself out to the public as being entitled to practice law as aforesaid,
or in any other manner, . . . or to assume, use, or advertize the title of lawyer,
or attorney and counselor-at-law .•. in such manner as to convey the impression
that he is a legal practitioner of law . . . without having first been duly and
regularly licensed and admitted to practice law in the courts of record of this
state . . . .
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1964) is the relevant federal legislation. See note I supra.
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Rule 3(c) of the District Court for the Southern District of New
York provides that "a member in good standing of the bar of any
state ... may upon motion be permitted to argue or try a particular
cause in whole or in part as counsel or advocate." 9 Although section
1654 of the Judicial Code, which authorizes federal courts to establish
such rules, appears to limit the application of such rules to the
practice of law before the court,10 Judge Friendly interpreted its
scope as reaching beyond the court room. He asserted that a grant
of leave to appear under section 1654 would encompass plaintiff's
services outside the courtroom and thus insulate him from any effects
of New York Penal Law section 270.U The majority also held that
it was irrelevant that plaintiff did not apply, since he surely would
have been admitted had he applied.12 Moreover, the court found
that, by engaging plaintiff to give advice in the antitrust action, defendant impliedly assumed the obligation of having the New York
lawyers make any necessary motions for admission pro hac vice.
Thus, the contract could be lawfully performed, and defendant
could not render the contract unenforceable by discharging plaintiff
in an attempt to deprive him of his opportunity to validate his status
through a pro hac vice admission procedure.
Due to the "importance of the problem, and the desirability of
furnishing guidance to the bar," 13 the court also based recovery on
an alternative ground. The court stated that it was not necessary to
predict whether New York courts would hold plaintiff's conduct
illegal under section 270:
for we hold that under the privileges and immunities clause of the
Constitution no state can prohibit a citizen with a federal claim or
defense from engaging an out-of-state lawyer to collaborate with an
in-state lawyer and give legal advice concerning it within the state.14
The court then noted that "where a right has been conferred on citizens by federal law, the constitutional guarantee against its abridgment must be read to include what is necessary and appropriate for
its assertion." 111 Such a right therefore should encompass the hiring
of an out-of-state attorney to assist a resident attorney in whatever
manner is chosen, subject only to the rules of the court concerning
practice before it. Thus, the court concluded that defendant had
exercised its constitutional right to obtain expert legal assistance,
and it cannot now be heard to object to paying the bill.
9. S.D.N.Y. CT. R. 3(c).
10. See note 1 supra.
11. Principal case at 169.
12. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
13. Principal case at 169.
14. Id. at 170.
15. Ibid.
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By using the privileges and immunities rationale, the principal
case raises, but fails to solve, several problems with respect to the
multi-state practice of law. Of the two privileges and immunities
clauses in the Constitution, it is clear that the court was referring
to the one found in section one of the fourteenth amendment,16
which declares that "no State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States."17 In the Slaughter-House Cases, 18 the Court distinguished
between citizenship of the United States and citizenship of the states,
and held that the fourteenth amendment protects only the privileges
and immunities of national citizenship. These privileges and immunities were defined as those rights which owe their existence "to
the federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or
its laws." 19 The Court refused to extend the protection of the privileges and immunities clause to ordinary civil rights, declaring that
such a construction would revolutionize the constitutional system
by transferring to the federal government the protection of those
basic rights of person and property which have always been secured
by the states.20 Ultimately, the Slaughter-House interpretation of
the privileges and immunities clause added little to what had already
16. The court's language goes to this clause. Moreover, Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46 (1947), Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940), and Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S.
404 (1935), cases cited by the court, discuss the fourteenth amendment's privileges and
immunities clause. The clause in article IV, section 2 is not relevant to the issue in the
principal case. Article IV, section 2 states that "the Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the Several States," and has been
interpreted to mean that a state may not discriminate against citizens of another state.
KAUPER, CAsES ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 1225 (3d ed. 1966). It is submitted that the state
statute involved in the principal case, N.Y. PEN. LAw § 270, applies equally to
residents and non-residents, and thus does not discriminate against non-residents.
17. A threshold question that must be answered is the dissent's charge that a privilege and immunities argument is not relevant, since no one, least of all the state of
New York, interfered with defendant's right to engage plaintiff. Principal case at 172.
The privilege and immunities theory is relevant, however, in that protection of the
client's right to make a binding contract also protects the attorney's ability to collect
his fee. The attorney asserts his right to fees, and the court grants recovery by asserting
the client's ability to make a binding contract. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 481 (1965).
18. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
19. Id. at 79. Similar definitions have been advanced in subsequent cases. See, e.g.,
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 444 (1935); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908).
20. 83 U.S. at 78. See 9 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 106, 114 (1940). In Corfield v. Coryell, 6
Fed. Cas. 546, 551 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823), Mr. Justice Washington described
the privileges and immunities of state citizens as those
which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have,
at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this
Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. ,vhat
these fundamental principles are, it would be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be comprehended under the following heads: Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to
acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness
and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly
prescribe for the general good of the whole.
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been declared to be the law of the land. In Crandall v. Nevada, 21
decided before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the Court
had affirmed the existence of the right to travel to the seat of the federal government to assert a claim against that government, stating
that such a right could be inferred from the Constitution and the
republican form of government which it established. Furthermore, if
rights of national citizenship are derived from the Constitution and
the legislative enactments under it, as stated in the Slaughter-House
Cases, 22 those rights may be protected by the supremacy clause without resort to the privileges and immunities clause.23
The result of the Slaughter-House Cases has been that few rights
have been held to be privileges and immunities of national citizenship. Since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme
Court has considered over fifty cases in which a state statute has been
attacked as violating the privileges and immunities clause.24 In only
one case was an abridgment found, 25 and that case was quickly overruled.26 In the Slaughter-House Cases, Mr. Justice Miller suggested
some privileges and immunities of national citizenship: the right to
the protection of the federal government when on the high seas or
within the jurisdiction of a foreign government; the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances; the right to use
the navigable waters of the United States; and the right to become
a citizen of any state. Other cases have offered additional examples:
the right both to come to the seat of government to assert a claim
against the government and to have free access to the federal government's judicial tribunals and public offices in every state and in the
District of Columbia; 27 the right to vote for national officers; 28 the
right to enter public lands; 29 and the right to protection against
violence while in the lawful custody of a United States marshall.30
Given the lack of preciseness in the defining of the privileges
and immunities of national citizenship, it can be argued that the
right of a party in an action involving a federal claim to engage an
out-of-state attorney is such a privilege. The court's rationale was
that "a right has been conferred on citizens by federal law (and)
the constitutional guarantee against its abridgment must be read
21. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
22. See note 18 supra, and accompanying text.
23. See Lomen, Privileges and Immunities Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 18
WASH. L. REv. 120, 124 (1943).
24. Most of these cases are listed in note 2 of Mr. Justice Stone's dissenting opinion
in Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 445 (1935), and in note 1 of his opinion in Hague
v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 520 (1939).
25. Colgate v. Harvey, supra note 24.
26. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
27. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
28. Ex parte Yarbrough, llO U.S. 651 (1884).
29. United States v. Waddell, ll2 U.S. 76 (1884).
30. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
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to include what is necessary and appropriate for its assertion." 31
Presumably, the court had determined that the federal anti-trust
laws under which defendant brought the industry suit conferred
upon him the right to engage out-of-state counsel. However, the
court apparently failed to consider the implications of United States
v. Cruikshank, in which the Court deleted reference to federal laws
and indicated that a privilege and immunity must fl.ow from the
"very idea of a government, republic in form . . . ." 32 Thus, one
could argue that only those rights owing their existence to the federal
government and its national character are protected by the privileges
and immunities clause. In addition, looking at the rights which
historically have been considered_ privileges and immunities of national citizenship, it is apparent that the court's finding of a privilege
and immunity in the principal case is an unprecedented use of that
clause. The right of a client with a federal claim or defense to engage
an out-of-state attorney does not resemble such rights as peaceful
assembly and petition or voting for national officers, which arguably
can be thought of as flowing from the very nature of our form of
government.
Nevertheless, in light of the efforts of a minority of the Justices
of the Supreme Court over the past two decades to revive the privileges and immunities clause, it is possible that the Court might look
favorably on the Second Circuit's use of the clause. However, the
cases that occasioned the attempted revival were cases involving
civil liberties, and it has been urged that the "intensely personal"
privileges and immunities clause is peculiarly applicable to civil
liberties.33 Involved in these cases were the right to be served in
places of public accommodation,34 the right of public assembly to
discuss rights conferred by the National Labor Relations Act,35 and,
finally, a state statute designed to prevent non-resident indigents
from entering the state.36 The principal case, on the other hand,
does not present a civil liberties issue, for the defendant was not
prevented from obtaining the expert legal advice necessary to protect
his rights. Moreover, since even in the three cases discussed above
the majority ruled on grounds other than the privileges and immunities clause, the "ghost clause" 37 has enjoyed at best only a minority
renaissance.
31. Principal case at 170.
32. 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876).
33. The desire of at least some of the members of the Court to rest cases involving civil liberties on clauses of more human connotation (than the due process
clause) is therefore understandable. The privileges and immunities clause is an
intensely human clause.
Weihofen, The Ghost Clause Walks Again, 14 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 77, 83 (1942).
34. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
35. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
36. Edwards v. California, 314: U.S. 160 (1941).
37. Weihofen, supra note 33.
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Assuming, arguendo, that the hiring of an attorney is a privilege
of national citizenship, many cases have held that state regulation of
the practice of law itself is not a violation of the privileges and immunities clause, "for a license to practice law is not a privilege within
the purview of any constitutional provision." 38 In the absence of a
federal rule or statute dealing with the conduct of a lawyer before
the federal courts, it is difficult to see why a state rule regulating the
practice of law in the state, including practice in the federal courts,
would not apply. Thus, the privilege to engage a non-resident attorney, if such a privilege existed, would have little significance if
the attorney did not meet the court's standard of admission and was
thus barred from appearing before the court.
The brief for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
offers another rationale for invoking the privileges and immunities
clause in the principal case: Access to the public institutions throughout the several states, including the national courts, was recognized
in Crandall v. Nevada39 as a right of national citizenship; that right
is impaired when one is unable to retain experts of his own choice
on matters committed by the Constitution to the federal courts.40
However, it is difficult to see how the citizen's access to the national
courts is impaired. He is free to select the expert help he desires,
and his access to the courts surely is not diminished by the fact that
those courts reserve the right to prescribe standards of conduct and
practice to which the expert must adhere. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has upheld the right of lower courts to control the practice of attorneys appearing before them.41
The use of the privileges and immunities clause in the principal
case also raises other serious questions with which the court failed
to deal. First, it has long been held that a corporation is not a citizen
within the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause and
therefore is not entitled to its protection. 42 The court in the principal
case, although not explicitly overruling this precedent, has implicitly
held that a corporation is a citizen since the defendant, whose right
to hire an attorney was said to be protected by the privileges and
immunities clause in the principal case, was in fact a corporation.
It is not necessarily illogical to assert that a corporation should be
protected by the privileges and immunities clause; certainly a corporation has no less interest in asserting its rights under federal law
with the aid of competent attorneys tha;11 does an individual. How38. Brents v. Stone, 60 F. Supp. 82, 84 (E.D. Ill. 1945).
39. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
40. Brief for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York as Amicus Curiae,
p. 10.
41. See note 1 supra.
42. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172
U.S. 557, 561 (1899).
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ever, a circuit court of appeals decision which stands contrary to a
long line of Supreme Court precedent, and which does so without
explicitly recognizing that fact, is a decision to be seriously questioned. A second problem raised by the decision in the principal
case is that since the privileges and immunities of national citizenship are limited to citizens,43 the right to engage expert out-of-state
legal aid is limited to citizens. However, the alien who possesses a
federal claim or defense is surely as much in need of expert legal
advice as is the citizen.
Given the doubtful validity of the court's use of the privileges
and immunities clause and the problems which are raised even if
the court has correctly invoked the clause, one must seek another
answer to the problem posed by the interstate practice of law44-a
problem that will become more acute in this age of increased specialization and high mobility of the bar. In the absence of applicable
federal rules or statutes, the simplest solution would be to abandon
the privileges and immunities theory and rely upon an orthodox
contract theory, as was done in Gray v. Joseph S. Brunetti Construction Co. 45 In Gray, the client, a resident of New Jersey, was involved
in a dispute with the Federal Housing Authority. He retained an
out-of-state attorney to work "behind the scenes" with his local attorneys. The court found that most of the attorney's work was performed in New Jersey. Since he had not been admitted to practice
before either the New Jersey state courts or the federal district court,
the district court lacked the independent jurisdiction to exercise the
autonomous control over his conduct which it would have over
members of its own bar. Nonetheless, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals allowed recovery of the attorney's fees solely on the basis
of New Jersey contract law. Thus, since the district court had found
that the contract was fairly made, the appellate court held that the
attorney was entitled to the entire fee. 46
In any situation involving the hiring of out-of-state attorneys, the
ultimate concern is assuring that effective control is exercised over
the activities of such lawyers. Neither the contract analysis of Gray
43. Trimble, The Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 10
U. KAN. CITY L. R.Ev. 77, 82 (1942); Weihofen, supra note 33, at 84.
44. One answer-admittedly more a stated truth than helpful analysis-is simply
that not all states are as strict as New York on the subject of the practice of law by non-

resident lawyers within their borders. The New Jersey Supreme Court, for example, in
Appell v. Reiner, 43 N.J. 313, 204 A.2d 146 (1964), acknowledged as the general rule
the proposition that legal services to New Jersey residents concerning New Jersey matters should be rendered by New Jersey counsel. The court recognized, however, that
given the many multi-state transactions arising in modern times, strict adherence to the
general rule may not always be in the public interest. If this were the attitude of the
New York courts, Judge Friendly might never have had to reach his constitutional
theory.
45. 266 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1959).
46. Id. at 818.
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v. Brunetti nor the privileges and immunities rationale of the court
in the principal case meets this basic issue of control. Moreover, the
narrow scope of the privileges and immunities clause, which would
not protect a corporation or an alien, makes it an unsatisfactory
answer to the issues raised by the principal case. It is submitted that
the answers to the problems inherent in the interstate practice of
law lie with Congress. Congress must either adopt laws regulating
the multistate practice of law or it must direct the Supreme Court
to lay dmvn applicable rules. It would appear preferable that Congress itself legislate with respect to the situation, for the Supreme
Court can only adopt rules affecting the federal courts and the
problem is as acute at the state level as it is at the federal level.

